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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 














GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Santiago Salinas-Cortez (“Salinas-Cortez”) appeals the District Court‟s judgment 
sentencing him to 144 months‟ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.  His 
counsel filed a brief, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that 
no nonfrivolous issues exist for appeal and seeking to withdraw as counsel.  For the 
reasons below, we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.   
I.  Background 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the facts 
essential to our discussion.  In February 2006, Salinas-Cortez and three co-defendants 
were arrested in connection with a large-scale cocaine conspiracy.  In short order, 
Salinas-Cortez pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms 
or more of cocaine and possession of five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to 
distribute.  The District Court sentenced Salinas-Cortez to 156 months‟ imprisonment, 
five years of supervised release, a fine of $500, and a special assessment of $200.   
Salinas-Cortez appealed on the ground that the District Court failed to consider his 
argument that he should receive a two-level reduction for minor role pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.2.  This Court affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence and remanded for 
the District Court to consider whether Salinas-Cortez was a “minor” participant.  At the 
resentencing hearing, the District Court rejected Salinas-Cortez‟s request for a reduction 
for minor role and also rejected defense counsel‟s argument that the court should 
consider Salinas-Cortez‟s post-sentencing rehabilitation.  The District Court reimposed 
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the original terms of the sentence and Salinas-Cortez again appealed.   
This Court vacated Salinas-Cortez‟s sentence again.  We directed the District 
Court to consider whether Salinas-Cortez‟s post-sentencing rehabilitation supports a 
downward variance, based on the Supreme Court‟s holding in Pepper v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011), which was decided one week after Salinas-Cortez had been 
resentenced.  At the second resentencing hearing, the District Court considered Salinas-
Cortez‟s post-sentencing rehabilitation, and reduced his sentence from 156 months to 144 
months‟ imprisonment.  The District Court reimposed the five years of supervised 
release, the $500 fine, and $200 special assessment.  Salinas-Cortez now appeals yet 
again.          
II.  Jurisdiction 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III.  Standard of Review 
“In Anders v. California, the Supreme Court explained the general duties of a 
lawyer representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal when the lawyer seeks 
leave to withdraw from continued representation on the grounds that there are no 
nonfrivolous issues to appeal.”  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citation omitted).  The attorney must always “support his client‟s appeal to the 
best of his ability.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  If, however, “counsel finds his case to be 
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court 
and request permission to withdraw.”  Id.   
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To withdraw, counsel must “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured 
the record in search of appealable issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  
Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780.  Hence, this Court‟s inquiry when considering a lawyer‟s 
Anders brief is two-fold; we must determine: “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled 
[Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2‟s] requirements; and (2) whether an 
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  In accordance with 3d Cir. L.A.R. Rule 109.2, 
if an appeal is judged to be wholly frivolous, this Court must “grant trial counsel‟s 
Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id. (quoting 
3d Cir. L.A.R. Rule 109.2(a) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
      IV.  Analysis 
Counsel thoroughly reviewed the record and identified three possible issues for 
appeal, none of which is nonfrivolous.
1
  First, counsel proffers that Salinas-Cortez might 
challenge the procedural reasonableness of the second sentencing rehearing.  Second, 
counsel suggests that Salinas-Cortez may dispute the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentence.  Finally, counsel points out that Salinas-Cortez might make a claim based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.
2
  Our review of the record discloses no other possible 
issues for appeal.     
                                                 
1
 The government agrees with counsel that no nonfrivolous issues exist and Salinas-
Cortez has not filed a pro se brief.   
 
2
 Salinas-Cortez made oral representations to appellate counsel indicating that he wished 
to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against his sentencing counsel.  Since 
appellate counsel and sentencing counsel are both employed by the Federal Community 
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A. Procedural Reasonableness of the Sentence  
This Court reviews the procedural reasonableness of a sentencing court under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2008).  In 
order to be procedurally reasonable, a sentencing court must follow a three-step process 
set forth in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).  United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 
148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011).  First, the court must begin by correctly determining the 
applicable guideline range.  Second, the court must determine whether to adjust the 
guidelines range.  Third, the court must consider all the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) as a whole, including whether a variance— a sentence outside the applicable 
guideline range— is warranted. 
  The District Court conformed to the relevant provisions of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) and followed the Gall three-step 
process.  The second sentencing rehearing focused on step three of the Gall three-step 
process since the case was remanded for the sole purpose of considering Salinas-Cortez‟s 
post-sentencing rehabilitation as grounds for a downward variance.  On the narrow issue 
of Salinas-Cortez‟s post-sentencing rehabilitation, the District Court considered an 
updated summary from the probation department, and educational transcripts and 
progress reports from incarceration facilities.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, appellate counsel foresaw a 
conflict of interest and sought to withdraw.  On January 4, 2013, this Court denied 
appellate counsel‟s motion to withdraw, noting that ineffective assistance of counsel 




Based upon evidence of Salinas-Cortez‟s post-sentencing rehabilitation, the 
District Court granted a downward variance, reducing Salinas-Cortez‟s sentence from 
156 months to 144 months‟ imprisonment.  The District Court considered objections and 
arguments of counsel and afforded Salinas-Cortez the opportunity to allocute.  The 
District Court stated its reasons for the particular sentence imposed and informed Salinas-
Cortez of his appellate rights.  In light of this evidence and the narrow scope under which 
the case was remanded, we find that the District Court committed no appealable 
procedural errors.  Therefore, appeal of the procedural reasonableness of Salinas-Cortez‟s 
sentence presents no nonfrivolous issues.             
B. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence 
This Court also reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentencing court under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010)).  In reviewing the 
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we look to “whether the final sentence, 
wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised upon 
appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.”  Id.  
 In this case, the correct procedure was employed and a reasonable conclusion 
reached given the evidence presented.  See Young, 634 F.3d at 237 (“Absent procedural 
error, we will affirm the sentencing court „unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.‟” (quoting Doe, 617 F.3d at 770 )).  Given that the sentence of 144 
months‟ imprisonment falls below the Sentencing Guidelines Range of 151 to 188 
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months‟ imprisonment, a challenge to the length of the imprisonment would fail under 
this deferential standard.   
A challenge to the imposition of five years‟ supervised release would also fail.  
The term of five years‟ supervision is mandatory.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).  The conditions 
of supervised release were also reasonable.  A sentencing court is given wide discretion 
in imposing a term of supervised release.  Nonetheless, that discretion is limited by the 
parameters set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583.  The terms and conditions of supervised release 
must be reasonable and related to the instant offense or to something in the defendant‟s 
history.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) and (d); see also United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 
183 (3d Cir. 2010).  In this case, the terms and conditions of the supervised release easily 
satisfy this test and are sufficiently tailored to Salinas-Cortez‟s offense and history.   
Finally, a challenge to the imposition of the financial assessments would fail.  The 
District Court reimposed the fine and special assessment but indicated in the judgment 
and commitment that Salinas-Cortez had already satisfied those obligations.  The 
statutory maximum for each of Salinas-Cortez‟s offenses is $4,000,000, for a total of 
$8,000,000.  Salinas-Cortez was fined $500.  The special assessment fee of $100 per 
count is mandated by statute.  18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A).  As a result, arguments 
regarding the substantive reasonableness of the financial components of the sentence 
present no nonfrivolous issues.     
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel  
 As a general rule, ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be brought on 
direct appeal.  United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2003).  Rather, such 
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claims are normally raised as part of a habeas petition.  Since Salinas-Cortez has already 
filed one petition pursuant to § 2255, counsel expressed concern that Salinas-Cortez may 
be barred from filing a second or successive petition, therefore preventing him from 
bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  In fact, notwithstanding the bar on 
second or successive habeas petitions, an inmate may file a § 2255 petition after a new 
judgment is entered after a resentencing.  Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S.Ct. 2788 (2010) 
(holding that habeas petitioner‟s fair-warning claim could be raised in the habeas petition 
challenging his death sentence that was imposed following a new sentencing hearing).  If 
he so chooses, Salinas-Cortez may still raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
a habeas petition.  Since an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is generally not 
reviewable on direct appeal, this argument, as Salinas-Cortez seeks to assert, presents no 
nonfrivolous issues.    
V.  Conclusion 
We find that no nonfrivolous issues exist for consideration on appeal.  We will 
grant counsel‟s request to withdraw, pursuant to Anders, and affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.  Counsel is also relieved of any obligation to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the Supreme Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b).   
